耶稣一下船，就有一个被污灵附着的人，从墓地里迎面而来。
那人经常住在坟墓中间，从来没有人能绑住他，甚至用锁链都不能。
曾经有很多次，人用脚镣和锁链捆绑他，锁链却被他挣断，脚镣也被他弄碎，始终没有人能制伏他。
他昼夜在坟墓里和山野间喊叫，又用石头砍自己。
(马可福音 5:2-5 新译本)
耶稣问他：『你叫什么名字？』
他回答：『我名叫「群」，因为我们众多。』
他再三央求耶稣，不要把他们从那地方赶走。
附近的山坡上有一大群猪正在吃东西；污灵求耶稣说：『打发我们到猪群那里附在猪身上吧。』
耶稣准了他们。
污灵就出来，进到猪群里去，于是那群猪闯下山崖，掉在海里淹死了，猪的数目约有两千。
放猪的人都逃跑了，到城里和各乡村去报告，大家就来看发生了什么事。
他们来到耶稣跟前，看见那被鬼附过的人，就是曾被名叫「群」的鬼附过的人，坐在那里，穿上了衣服，神志清醒，他们就害怕。
(马可福音 5:9-15 新译本)
我想起人群的疯癫历史——义和团、纳粹集中营、文化大革命、圣战萨拉菲。
论道德的谱系
On the Genealogy of Morality
前言
Preface
三 探索道德概念的起源与含义：个人旅程
3 Exploring the Origins and Implications of Moral Concepts: A Personal Journey
怀着一种我只能勉强承认的特有怀疑态度，它与道德以及迄今为止地球上被称颂为道德的一切有关——这种怀疑在我的生活中如此早地、不请自来地、不停地涌现出来，并与我的周围环境、时代、先例和传承产生了如此大的冲突，以至于我几乎有理由将其称为我的『先验』（a priori）——最终，我的好奇心和怀疑心注定会集中在我们所谓的善与恶的起源问题上。事实上，作为一个十三岁的男孩，我就已经对邪恶的起源问题感到困惑：在一个心中『半是儿童游戏，半是上帝』｛Goethe, 浮士德 1. 3781行。｝的年纪，我将我的第一个文学儿童游戏，我的第一篇哲学文章，献给了这个问题——至于我当时对这个问题的『解决方案』，我完全正确地将其归功于上帝，并使他成为「邪恶」的父亲。我的『先验』要我这么做吗？那种新的、不道德的，或者至少是非道德主义的『先验』：以及那种［哦，如此反康德］的、如此神秘的『绝对命令』，｛伊曼努尔·康德在他的两部主要伦理学著作《道德形而上学的基础》（1785年）和《实践理性批判》（1788年）中给出了他认为的道德基本原则的多种不同表述。在《道德形而上学的基础》中，第一个『绝对命令』的表述是：『仅仅依据你同时能够希望它成为普遍法则的准则来行动』（《基础》，第一部分）。｝它从中发出声音，我也在这期间越来越倾听，而且不仅仅是倾听它……幸运的是，我及时学会了将神学偏见与道德偏见分开，我不再在世界之外寻找邪恶的起源。通过一些历史和语言学的训练，加上我对所有心理问题的天生挑剔，很快将我的问题转变为另一个问题：人类在什么条件下发明了善与恶的价值判断？它们本身的价值是什么？它们迄今为止是阻碍了还是促进了人类的繁荣？它们是困境、贫困和生命退化的标志吗？或者，相反，它们揭示了生命的充盈、力量和意志，揭示了生命的勇气、信心和未来？对于这些问题，我找到了各种各样的答案，并大胆提出了自己的见解，我区分了时代、民族、个人的等级，我把我的问题专门化，并从这些答案中发展出新的问题、调查、猜想、可能性，直到我有了自己的领域，自己的土壤，一个悄然成长和开花的完整世界，仿佛是秘密花园，其存在不应被任何人察觉……哦！我们这些知识分子是多么幸福，只要我们能保持足够长时间的沉默！……
With a characteristic scepticism to which I confess only reluctantly - it relates to morality and to all that hitherto on earth has been celebrated as morality –, a scepticism which sprang up in my life so early, so unbidden, so unstoppably, and which was in such conflict with my surroundings, age, precedents and lineage that I would almost be justified in calling it my ‘a priori’, – eventually my curiosity and suspicion were bound to fix on the question of what origin our terms good and evil actually have. Indeed, as a thirteen-year-old boy, I was preoccupied with the problem of the origin of evil: at an age when one’s heart was ‘half-filled with childish games, half-filled with God’, ｛Goethe, Faust 1. 3781f.｝ I dedicated my first literary childish game, my first philosophical essay, to this problem – and as regards my ‘solution’ to the problem at that time, I quite properly gave God credit for it and made him the father of evil. Did my ‘a priori’ want this of me? That new, immoral, or at least immoralistic ‘a priori’: and the oh-so-anti-Kantian, so enigmatic ‘categorical imperative’ ｛Immanuel Kant gives a number of different formulations of what he takes to be the basic principle of morality in his two major works on ethics, The Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (1785) and the Critique of Practical Reason (1788). The first formulation of the ‘categorical imperative’ in The Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals reads: ‘Act only on that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law’ (Groundwork, section 1).｝ which spoke from it and to which I have, in the meantime, increasingly lent an ear, and not just an ear? … Fortunately I learnt, in time, to separate theological from moral prejudice and I no longer searched for the origin of evil beyond the world. Some training in history and philology, together with my innate fastidiousness with regard to all psychological problems, soon transformed my problem into another: under what conditions did man invent the value judgments good and evil? and what value do they themselves have? Have they up to now obstructed or promoted human flourishing? Are they a sign of distress, poverty and the degeneration of life? Or, on the contrary, do they reveal the fullness, strength and will of life, its courage, its confidence, its future? To these questions I found and ventured all kinds of answers of my own, I distinguished between epochs, peoples, grades of rank between individuals, I focused my inquiry, and out of the answers there developed new questions, investigations, conjectures, probabilities until I had my own territory, my own soil, a whole silently growing and blossoming world, secret gardens, as it were, the existence of which nobody must be allowed to suspect … Oh! how happy we are, we knowers, provided we can keep quiet for long enough! …
永恒主的话又传与我说：
人子啊，你要为推罗王举哀唱歌，对他说：
主永恒主这么说：
『你是「完美」之印章，
满有才智，十全美丽，
你曾在伊甸上帝园中，
有各样宝石做你的服饰：
就是肉红玉髓、黄玉、金钢石、
黄璧玺、水苍玉、碧玉、
蓝宝石、红玉、绿宝石；
并且你的「手鼓」和你那里的
宝石座的巧工都是金的，
是在你被创造的日子
就整备了的。
我把你安置跟一个护卫者
被膏的基路伯在一起；
你就在上帝的圣山上；
在发光如火的宝石中间往来。
从被创造的日子
你的行径就都完善，
直到在你中间发现了不义。
因为你作的生意很多，
你中间就充满了强暴的事，
以致你犯罪；
因此我抛掷你为污俗
离开上帝的山，
护卫者基路伯也将你
从发光如火的宝石中除灭掉。
你因你的美丽而心里高傲；
又为了你的光华
而败坏你的才智。
我将你摔倒于地，
使你暴露身体于君王面前，
让他们目覩为快。
因你罪孽很多，
因你作生意不公道，
你污辱了你的「圣地方」；
故此我使火从你中间发出
烧灭了你，
我就使你在所有观看的人眼前
变为地上的炉灰。
列族之民中凡认识你的
都必为你而惊骇；
你遭受了可怕的灾难，
就永远不存在了。』
(以西结书 28:11-19 吕振中)
「无灵论」是《论道德的谱系》的前提和根基。
第一章 『善与恶』、『好与坏』
First essay: ‘Good and Evil’, ‘Good and Bad’
十 贵族道德与奴隶道德的对比
10 The Dichotomy of Noble Morality and Slave Morality
奴隶道德与贵族道德的对立
奴隶道德反叛的开端发生在怨恨（ressentiment）本身变得创造性并诞生出价值的时候：那些被剥夺了行动正当反应的存在者，通过想象中的复仇来补偿自己。而所有高贵的道德则源于对自身的凯旋式的『是』的肯定，奴隶道德则原则上对一切「外在」、「他者」、「非自我」说『不』：这个『不』就是它的创造性行为。评价视角的这种逆转——这种对外在的本质性导向，而不是向自身的回溯——是怨恨的一个特征：为了形成，奴隶道德首先需要一个对立的、外在的世界，从生理学上讲，它需要外部刺激才能采取行动，——它的行动本质上是一种反应。高贵的评价方式则完全相反：它自发地行动和成长，寻找它的对立面只是为了更加感激和欢欣地对自己说『是』，——它的负面概念「低贱」、「普通」、「坏」只是其积极的基本概念之后产生的苍白对比，而这些积极概念则是充满了生命和激情：『我们是高贵的、善良的、美丽的和幸福的！』。
贵族评价方式的局限与怨恨的影响
当高贵的评价方式犯错误并违背现实时，这是在它不够熟悉的领域内发生的，在某些情况下，它错误判断了它蔑视的领域，即普通人的领域；另一方面，我们应该记住，蔑视、轻蔑和高傲的感觉带来的扭曲——假设被蔑视者的形象确实被扭曲了——远不及无力者的根深蒂固的仇恨和复仇对其对手（当然是象征性的）的攻击所造成的扭曲。事实上，蔑视中混杂了太多的轻忽、随意、自满和不耐烦，甚至还混杂着太多的个人愉快，以至于它无法将对象变成真正的讽刺和怪物。
语言中体现的贵族精神与怨恨者的心理特征
我们也不应忽视希腊贵族在用所有词语区分自己与普通人时所表现出的几乎是友好的色调；一种同情、考虑和宽容不断地渗透并掩盖它们，以至于几乎所有指普通人的词语都仍然是「不幸」、「可怜」的表达（比较 δειλός, δειλαιος, πονηρός, μοχθηρός，后两个实际上将普通人描述为奴隶劳动者和牲畜）——而且「坏」、「低贱」和「不幸」在希腊人的耳中从未停止以「不幸」为主导的音调回荡：这是古老的、更高贵的、贵族的评价方式的遗产，即使在蔑视中也不否认自己（——语言学家们会记得 οἰζυρός, ἄνολβος, τλήμων, δυςτυχεῖν, ξυμφορά 的用法）。
幸福与贵族精神的关联
「高贵」的人感觉自己是「幸福的」；他们不需要首先通过观察敌人，或者在某些情况下通过自我暗示、自我欺骗来构建自己的幸福（正如所有怨恨的人所习惯的那样）；并且作为充满力量并因此必然积极的完整人类，他们知道他们必须将幸福与行动结合在一起，——行动必然被视为幸福的一部分（这是 ἐν πρᾶττειν 的词源）——这与无力者、被压迫者和充满毒性和敌对情绪的人所理解的「幸福」完全相反，对于他们来说，幸福本质上表现为麻醉剂、镇静剂、休息、平和、「安息日」、心灵的放松和四肢的舒展，简而言之，是一种被动的东西。
高贵者与怨恨者在智慧上的区别
高贵的人对自己是自信和坦率的（γενναῖος, 「贵族出生」，强调「正直」和可能的「天真」的色彩），而怨恨的人对自己既不正直也不天真，也不诚实和坦率。他的灵魂斜视；他的心灵喜欢黑暗的角落、秘密的小径和后门，一切秘密的东西都吸引他，因为那是他的世界，他的安全，他的舒适；他知道如何保持沉默、不忘记、等待、暂时谦卑和贬低自己。这样的怨恨之人必然会比任何高贵的种族更加聪明，并且会以完全不同的程度尊重聪明：即作为第一等级的生存条件，而高贵者则可以轻易地享受带有一种奢侈和精致的微妙余味的聪明：——正因为在（作为生存条件）这个方面，聪明远没有支配性的无意识本能的完全确定性重要，也远没有某种特定的缺乏聪明重要，例如大胆冲向危险或敌人，或那些由来已久的愤怒、爱、敬仰、感激和复仇的狂热突发，这些都是高贵灵魂历代以来彼此认同的标志。
怨恨对高贵者的影响与宽恕的力量
当怨恨确实在高贵者身上发生时，它被立即的反应所消耗和耗尽，因此不会毒害，另一方面，在许多情况下，它根本不会发生，而对于所有弱者和无能为力的人来说，这是不可避免的。不能长时间认真对待他的敌人、不幸，甚至是他的罪行——这是强大、圆满的天性的标志，拥有一种灵活的、塑造的、治愈的并能让人忘记的超强的力量（现代世界的一个好例子是米拉波，他对针对他的侮辱和轻视没有任何记忆并且不能饶恕人，只是因为他——忘记了）。这样的人一甩肩膀，就能抖掉许多会钻进另一个人身上的虫子；实际的『爱你的仇敌』也只在这里才有可能——假设它在地球上是可能的。｛根据马太福音 5:43-44。｝
贵族与敌人的关系
高贵的人对他的敌人有多么尊重！——这种尊重是一座通向爱的桥梁……因为他坚持要将他的敌人留给自己，作为一种区分的标志，实际上他会容忍的敌人只有那些没有任何可鄙之处并且值得高度尊重的人！与此相对，想象一下怨恨之人对「敌人」的设想——在这里我们看到了他的行为、他的创造：他将「邪恶的敌人」、「那恶者」构想为一个基本概念，现在他想出了一个对应物，那「良善者」——他自己！……
The beginning of the slaves’ revolt in morality occurs when ressentiment itself turns creative and gives birth to values: the ressentiment of those beings who, denied the proper response of action, compensate for it only with imaginary revenge. Whereas all noble morality grows out of a triumphant saying ‘yes’ to itself, slave morality says ‘no’ on principle to everything that is ‘outside’, ‘other’, ‘non-self’: and this ‘no’ is its creative deed. This reversal of the evaluating glance – this essential orientation to the outside instead of back onto itself – is a feature of ressentiment: in order to come about, slave morality first has to have an opposing, external world, it needs, physiologically speaking, external stimuli in order to act at all, – its action is basically a reaction. The opposite is the case with the noble method of valuation: this acts and grows spontaneously, seeking out its opposite only so that it can say ‘yes’ to itself even more thankfully and exultantly, – its negative concept ‘low’, ‘common’, ‘bad’ is only a pale contrast created after the event compared to its positive basic concept, saturated with life and passion, ‘we the noble, the good, the beautiful and the happy!’ When the noble method of valuation makes a mistake and sins against reality, this happens in relation to the sphere with which it is not sufficiently familiar, a true knowledge of which, indeed, it rigidly resists: in some circumstances, it misjudges the sphere it despises, that of the common man, the rabble; on the other hand, we should bear in mind that the distortion which results from the feeling of contempt, disdain and superciliousness, always assuming that the image of the despised person is distorted, remains far behind the distortion with which the entrenched hatred and revenge of the powerless man attacks his opponent – in effigy of course. Indeed, contempt has too much negligence, nonchalance, complacency and impatience, even too much personal cheerfulness mixed into it, for it to be in a position to transform its object into a real caricature and monster. Nor should one fail to hear the almost kindly nuances which the Greek nobility, for example, places in all words that it uses to distinguish itself from the rabble; a sort of sympathy, consideration and indulgence incessantly permeates and sugars them, with the result that nearly all words referring to the common man remain as expressions for ‘unhappy’, ‘pitiable’ (compare δειλός, δειλαιος, πονηρός, μοχθηρός, the last two actually designating the common man as slave worker and beast of burden) – and on the other hand, ‘bad’, ‘low’ and ‘unhappy’ have never ceased to reverberate in the Greek ear in a tone in which ‘unhappy’ predominates: this is a legacy of the old, nobler, aristocratic method of valuation that does not deny itself even in contempt (– philologists will remember the sense in which οἰζυρός, ｛‘Oi’ is an interjection expressive of pain. A person whose life gives ample occasion for the use of this interjection is ‘oizuros’.｝ ἄνολβος, ｛‘not prosperous, unfortunate’.｝ τλήμων, ｛‘tlēnai’ = to bear, endure, suffer. A person who must endure things is ‘tlemon’.｝ δυςτυχεῖν, ｛‘to have bad luck’.｝ ξυμφορά ｛‘accident, misfortune’.｝ are used). The ‘well-born’ felt they were ‘the happy’; they did not need first of all to construct their happiness artificially by looking at their enemies, or in some cases by talking themselves into it, lying themselves into it (as all men of ressentiment are wont to do); and also, as complete men bursting with strength and therefore necessarily active, they knew they must not separate happiness from action, - being active is by necessity counted as part of happiness (this is the etymological derivation of ἐν πρᾶττειν) ｛This expression (eu prattein) has something like the ambiguity of the English ‘do well’ = ‘engage in some activity successfully’ or ‘fare well’. There is no expression in common use in German with a parallel ambiguity.｝ – all very much the opposite of ‘happiness’ at the level of the powerless, the oppressed, and those rankled with poisonous and hostile feelings, for whom it manifests itself as essentially a narcotic, an anaesthetic, rest, peace, ‘sabbath’, relaxation of the mind and stretching of the limbs, in short as something passive. While the noble man is confident and frank with himself (γενναῖος, ‘of noble birth’, underlines the nuance ‘upright’ and probably ‘naïve’ as well), the man of ressentiment is neither upright nor naïve, nor honest and straight with himself. His soul squints; his mind loves dark corners, secret paths and back-doors, everything secretive appeals to him as being his world, his security, his comfort; he knows all about keeping quiet, not forgetting, waiting, temporarily humbling and abasing himself. A race of such men of ressentiment will inevitably end up cleverer than any noble race, and will respect cleverness to a quite different degree as well: namely, as a condition of existence of the first rank, whilst the cleverness of noble men can easily have a subtle aftertaste of luxury and refinement about it: – precisely because in this area, it is nowhere near as important as the complete certainty of function of the governing unconscious instincts, nor indeed as important as a certain lack of cleverness, such as a daring charge at danger or at the enemy, or those frenzied sudden fits of anger, love, reverence, gratitude and revenge by which noble souls down the ages have recognized one another. When ressentiment does occur in the noble man himself, it is consumed and exhausted in an immediate reaction, and therefore it does not poison, on the other hand, it does not occur at all in countless cases where it is unavoidable for all who are weak and powerless. To be unable to take his enemies, his misfortunes and even his misdeeds seriously for long – that is the sign of strong, rounded natures with a superabundance of a power which is flexible, formative, healing and can make one forget (a good example from the modern world is Mirabeau, who had no recall for the insults and slights directed at him and who could not forgive, simply because he – forgot.) A man like this shakes from him, with one shrug, many worms which would have burrowed into another man; actual ‘love of your enemies’ is also possible here and here alone - assuming it is possible at all on earth. ｛Gospel according to Matthew 5:43-44.｝ How much respect a noble man has for his enemies! – and a respect of that sort is a bridge to love … For he insists on having his enemy to himself, as a mark of distinction, indeed he will tolerate as enemies none other than such as have nothing to be despised and a great deal to be honoured! Against this, imagine ‘the enemy’ as conceived of by the man of ressentiment – and here we have his deed, his creation: he has conceived of the ‘evil enemy’, ‘the evil one’ as a basic idea to which he now thinks up a copy and counterpart, the ‘good one’ – himself! …
尼采，在第一章中，以「无灵论」的视角，阐述了「宗教」和「道德」的起源：奴隶们在「怨恨」中构想出「邪恶的魔鬼」；在「新式的爱」中构想出「良善的神」。
亚当给他妻子起名叫夏娃，因为她是众生之母。
耶和华神为亚当和他妻子用皮子作衣服给他们穿。
(创世记 3:20-21 恢复本)
耶和华说，我的意念并非你们的意念，你们的道路并非我的道路。
天怎样高过地，照样我的道路高过你们的道路，我的意念高过你们的意念。
(以赛亚书 55:8-9 恢复本)
因为除了在人里面人的灵，在人中间有谁知道人的事？照样，除了神的灵，也没有人知道神的事。
(哥林多前书 2:11 恢复本)
「堕落之前的亚当」比「堕落之后的人类」更加了解「良善的神」吗？
「良善的神」拯救了「堕落之后的亚当」吗？
「得救之后的亚当」比「堕落之前的亚当」更加了解「良善的神」吗？
「软弱无力的奴隶们」是怎么了解「良善的神」的？
弟兄们，你们看你们蒙召的，按着肉体有智慧的不多，有能力的不多，出身尊高的也不多；
神却拣选了世上愚拙的，叫那有智慧的羞愧；神又拣选了世上软弱的，叫那强壮的羞愧；
神也拣选了世上出身卑下的，以及被人藐视的，就是那些无有的，为要废掉那些有的，
使一切属肉体的人，在神面前都不能夸口。
但你们得在基督耶稣里，是出于神，这基督成了从神给我们的智慧：公义、圣别和救赎，
为使，如经上所记：『夸口的当在主里夸口。』
(哥林多前书 1:26-31 恢复本)
他们藉着信，就战胜了敌国，伸张了正义，得到了应许，堵住了狮子的口，
消灭了烈火的威力，逃脱了刀剑的锋刃，软弱变成刚强，在战争中显出大能，把外国的军队击退。
(希伯来书 11:33-34 新译本)
雅各啊！你为什么这样说；
以色列啊！你为什么埋怨说：
『我的道路向耶和华隐藏，
我的案件被我的 神忽略了』？
你不知道吗？你没有听过吗？
永在的 神、耶和华、地极的创造主
既不疲乏，也不困倦；
他的知识无法测度。
疲乏的，他赐气力，
无力的，他加力量。
就是年轻人也会疲乏困倦，
强壮的人也会全然跌倒。
但那些仰望耶和华的人，
必重新得力；
他们必像鹰一样展翅上腾；
他们奔跑，也不困倦，
他们行走，也不疲乏。
(以赛亚书 40:27-31 新译本)
「神性」里有「刚强」「谦卑」。
「魔性」里有「高傲」；「兽性」里有「软弱」。
尼采所谓的『贵族性』是一种「神性」和「魔性」的混合；
尼采所谓的『奴隶性』是一种「兽性」和「神性」的混合。
过了许久，埃及王死了。以色列人因受奴役，就叹息哀号，他们的哀声上达于神。
(出埃及记 2:23 恢复本)
恶人在骄横中，把穷苦人追得火急；愿他们陷入自己所设的计谋里！
(诗篇 10:2 恢复本)
我又见日光之下所行的一切欺压。看哪，受欺压的流泪，无人安慰；欺压他们的有势力，也无人安慰他们。
(传道书 4:1 恢复本)
耶和华必控诉民中的长老和首领，说，吃尽葡萄园果子的，就是你们；从贫穷人所夺的，都在你们家中。
(以赛亚书 3:14 恢复本)
那凭不义盖房，凭不公造楼，白白用他邻舍作工却不给工价的，有祸了。
(耶利米书 22:13 恢复本)
以色列众支派都到希伯仑来见大卫，说：『看哪！我们都是你的骨肉至亲。从前扫罗作我们的王的时候，领导以色列人行动的是你。耶和华也曾对你说：「你要牧养我的子民以色列，要作以色列的领袖。」』以色列的众长老都到希伯仑来见王。大卫王在希伯仑耶和华面前与他们立约，他们就膏立大卫作以色列的王。大卫登基的时候是三十岁，在位共四十年。他在希伯仑作犹大的王七年零六个月；在耶路撒冷作全以色列和犹大的王三十三年。
(撒母耳记下 5:1-5 新译本)
你要提醒他们服从执政的和掌权的，听从他们，随时准备作各种善工。不可毁谤人，要与人无争，谦恭有礼，向众人表现充分温柔的心。我们从前也是无知、不顺服、受了迷惑、被各种私欲和逸乐所奴役，生活在恶毒和嫉妒之中，是可憎可恶的，并且互相仇视。
然而，到了 神我们的救主显明他的恩慈和怜爱的时候，他就救了我们，并不是由于我们所行的义，而是照着他的怜悯，藉着重生的洗和圣灵的更新。圣灵就是 神藉着我们的救主耶稣基督丰丰富富浇灌在我们身上的，使我们既然因着他的恩典得称为义，就可以凭着永生的盼望成为后嗣。
这话是可信的，我愿你确实地强调这些事，使信 神的人常常留心作善工；这些都是美事，并且是对人有益的。
(提多书 3:1-8 新译本)
政府的权柄，人人都应当服从。因为没有一样权柄不是从 神来的；掌权的都是 神设立的。所以抗拒掌权的，就是反对 神所设立的；反对的人必自招刑罚。执政的不是要使行善的惧怕，而是要使作恶的惧怕。你想不怕掌权的吗？只要行善，就会得到称赞；因为他是 神的仆役，是对你有益的。但如果你作恶，就应当惧怕；因为他佩剑，不是没有作用的。他是 神的仆役，是向作恶的人施行刑罚的。所以你们必须服从，不但是因为刑罚，也是因为良心的缘故。因此，你们也当纳税，因为他们是 神的差役，专责处理这事的。你们要向各人清还所欠的；应当纳税的，就要给他纳税；应当进贡的，就给他进贡；应当敬畏的，就敬畏他；应当尊敬的，就尊敬他。
(罗马书 13:1-7 新译本)
弟兄们，我劝你们要提防那些离间你们、绊倒你们、使你们违反你们所学的教义的人。你们也要避开他们，因为这样的人不服事我们的主基督，只服事自己的肚腹，用花言巧语欺骗老实人的心。你们的顺服已经名闻各处，所以我为你们高兴。我愿你们在善事上有智慧，在恶事上毫不沾染。赐平安的 神快要把撒但践踏在你们脚下。愿我们主耶稣的恩惠与你们同在。
(罗马书 16:17-20 新译本)
你们因着自己的过犯和罪恶，原是死的。那时你们在过犯和罪恶中行事为人，随着时代的潮流，也服从空中掌权的首领，就是现今在悖逆的人身上运行的灵。
(以弗所书 2:1-2 新译本)
我儿提摩太啊！我照着从前关于你的预言，把这命令交托你，为的是要叫你藉着这些预言打那美好的仗。常常存着信心和无愧的良心。有些人丢弃良心，就在信仰上失落了。他们当中有许米乃和亚历山大，我已经把他们交给撒但，使他们受管教不再亵渎。
(提摩太前书 1:18-20 新译本)
因此，我劝你最重要的是要为万人、君王和一切有权位的恳求、祷告、代求和感恩，好让我们可以敬虔庄重地过平静安稳的日子。在我们的救主 神看来，这是美好的，可蒙悦纳的。他愿意万人得救，并且充分认识真理。因为 神只有一位，在 神和人中间也只有一位中保，就是降世为人的基督耶稣。他舍了自己作万人的赎价，到了适当的时候，这事就证实了。为了这事，我也被派作传道的和使徒（我说的是真话，不是谎言），在信仰和真理上作外族人的教师。
(提摩太前书 2:1-7 新译本)
若遇见你仇敌的牛或驴失迷了路，总要牵回来交给他。
若看见恨你之人的驴压卧在重驮之下，不可离他不顾，务要和他一同抬开重驮。
(出埃及记 23:4-5 恢复本)
以色列王见了他们，就问以利沙说，我父啊，我可以击杀他们么？我可以击杀他们么？
以利沙说，不可击杀他们。你用刀用弓掳来的，你岂会击杀他们么？当在他们面前设摆饮食，使他们吃喝，然后回到他们的主人那里。
王就为他们预备了盛大的筵席；他们吃喝完了，王打发他们离去，他们就回到自己主人那里。从此，亚兰人不再结队侵犯以色列地了。
(列王纪下 6:21-23 恢复本)
你的仇敌若饿了，就给他饭吃；若渴了，就给他水喝；
因为你这样行，就是把炭火堆在他的头上；耶和华也必赏报你。
(箴言 25:21-22 恢复本)
耶稣被接上升的日子将要到了，就硬着头皮、面向耶路撒冷走去，又差遣使者在他前面。他们就去，进了撒玛利亚的一个村庄、要为他豫备。那里的人却不接待他，因为他面向着耶路撒冷走去。他的门徒雅各、约翰看见了，就说：『主啊，你愿意我们吩咐火从天上降下来，烧灭他们么？』耶稣转过身来责备他们。就往别的村庄去了。
(路加福音 9:51-55 吕振中)
那些较为高贵的作者们，在《圣经》中，写下了低贱者们之间的爱与恨。并且，那些作者们写到：『要爱你的邻舍如同你自己』。｛马可福音 12:31 吕振中｝
你们听见有话说，『当爱你的邻舍，恨你的仇敌。』
但是我告诉你们，要爱你们的仇敌，为那逼迫你们的祷告，
你们就可以作你们诸天之上父的儿子；因为祂叫祂的日头上升，照恶人，也照好人；降雨给义人，也给不义的人。
(马太福音 5:43-45 恢复本)
你们站着祷告的时候，若向什么人怀怨，要赦免他，好叫你们在诸天之上的父，也赦免你们的过犯。
（你们若不赦免人，你们在诸天之上的父，也不赦免你们的过犯。）
(马可福音 11:25-26 恢复本)
十七 哲学、语言学、生理学与医学的联合探讨的必要性
17 The Need for an Interdisciplinary Approach to the History and Evaluation of Moral Concepts
备注。我借此论文的机会，公开正式表达我之前仅在与学者的私人对话中提到的一个愿望：那就是，某个哲学系能够通过一系列学术论文竞赛，推动对道德史的研究——也许这本书能在这一方向上起到有力的推动作用。关于这一可能性，我提出以下问题以供思考：它值得语言学家和历史学家，以及职业哲学家的关注：
『语言学，尤其是词源学的研究，对道德概念演变的历史提供了哪些指引？』
——另一方面，争取生理学家和医生对这些问题（关于以前所有价值判断本身的价值）的支持同样至关重要。我们可以把这一任务交给职业哲学家来充当倡导者和调解者，因为他们完全成功地将哲学与生理学和医学之间原本如此保留和猜疑的关系转变为最热诚、最富有成效的交流。事实上，历史上或民族学研究中已知的每一个价值体系，每一个『你应当』首先都需要生理学的解释和阐明，而不是心理学的解释；所有这些都需要医学的批判性研究。这个问题需要从不同角度提出：『这种或那种价值体系和「道德」值什么？』尤其是『为了什么的价值？』这一问题不应被过于粗略地看待。比如，某些东西显然对于某一族群最长可能的延续（或对适应特定气候的能力的提高，或维持最大数量）具有价值，但若是为了发展出更强种类的话，价值就截然不同了。多数人的利益和少数人的利益是相互冲突的道德立场；我们将前者本身视为更高价值的观点留给那些天真的英国生物学家们……全部科学从现在起都必须为未来哲学家的工作铺平道路：这项工作被理解为哲学家必须解决价值问题并决定价值等级顺序。——
Note. I take the opportunity presented to me by this essay, of publicly and formally expressing a wish that I have only expressed in occasional conversations with scholars up till now: that is, that some Faculty of Philosophy should do the great service of promoting the study of the history of morality by means of a series of academic prize essays: – perhaps this book might serve to give a powerful impetus in such a direction. With regard to such a possibility, I raise the following question for consideration: it merits the attention of philologists and historians as well as those who are actually philosophers by profession:
‘*What signposts does linguistics, especially the study of etymology, give to the history of the evolution of moral concepts?*’
– On the other hand, it is just as essential to win the support of physiologists and doctors for these problems (on the value of all previous valuations): we can leave it to the professional philosophers to act as advocates and mediators in this, once they have completely succeeded in transforming the originally so reserved and suspicious relationship between philosophy, physiology and medicine into the most cordial and fruitful exchange. Indeed, every table of values, every ‘thou shalt’ known to history or the study of ethnology, needs first and foremost a physiological elucidation and interpretation, rather than a psychological one; and all of them await critical study from medical science. The question: what is this or that table of values and ‘morals’ worth? needs to be asked from different angles; in particular, the question ‘value for what?’ cannot be examined too finely. Something, for example, which obviously had value with regard to the longest possible life-span of a race (or to the improvement of its abilities to adapt to a particular climate, or to maintaining the greatest number) would not have anything like the same value if it was a question of developing a stronger type. The good of the majority and the good of the minority are conflicting moral standpoints: we leave it to the naïvety of English biologists to view the first as higher in value as such … All sciences must, from now on, prepare the way for the future work of the philosopher: this work being understood to mean that the philosopher has to solve the problem of values and that he has to decide on the rank order of values. –
如何仿造人脑的良心机能和决策机能？
人脑的良心机能、决策机能与人脑海马体有什么关系？
ChatGPT：
- 良心机能
- 定义: 良心机能是指个人对道德、伦理的内在感知和判断能力。它与道德决策、善恶判断以及社会规范的遵循密切相关。
- 相关脑区: 良心机能主要涉及前额叶皮层（尤其是内侧前额叶皮层）和前扣带回皮层，这些区域与道德判断、情绪调节、自我反省等功能相关。
- 海马体的作用: 虽然海马体并不是良心机能的直接参与者，但它在记忆形成和情景记忆中扮演重要角色。良心的形成往往依赖于个体过去的经历和记忆，因此海马体间接影响了良心机能的运作。
- 决策机能
- 定义: 决策机能是指个体在面对选择时，分析、评估并最终做出决定的能力。它涉及复杂的认知过程，包括信息整合、风险评估和未来后果的预测。
- 相关脑区: 决策机能主要由前额叶皮层（尤其是背外侧前额叶皮层）负责，这一区域在理性思考、规划和冲动控制方面起重要作用。此外，伏隔核与多巴胺系统也参与了奖赏和动机相关的决策过程。
- 海马体的作用: 海马体在决策过程中通过对情景记忆和情感经验的回忆，帮助个体预测不同选择可能带来的结果。这些记忆和经验能够影响个体在决策过程中的判断，从而影响最终的决策。
- 海马体
- 定义: 海马体是大脑中负责记忆形成、学习和空间导航的重要结构。它在将短期记忆转化为长期记忆，以及情景记忆的形成中起关键作用。
- 功能: 海马体通过储存和检索记忆，帮助个体在决策和道德判断时调用过往经验，进而影响良心和决策的运作。
- 良心机能、决策机能与海马体的关系
- 相互作用: 海马体存储和处理的情景记忆和情感体验为良心和决策机能提供了重要的背景信息。通过调用这些记忆，个体可以更好地进行道德判断和复杂决策。例如，在道德困境中，海马体的记忆回调功能可以使个体联想到类似情境下的经验，从而影响良心的判断和最终的决策。
- 交叉影响: 良心机能和决策机能之间有时是紧密相连的。良心可能影响决策，特别是在涉及道德和伦理的决策中，而决策过程中的认知评估也可能会引导良心的判断。而海马体通过对相关记忆的调用，成为这两者之间重要的桥梁。
腹侧被盖区（VTA）（tegmentum 是拉丁语，意为覆盖），也被称为蔡氏腹侧被盖区，或简称为腹侧被盖，是一群位于中脑底部靠近中线的神经元群。
The ventral tegmental area (VTA) (tegmentum is Latin for covering), also known as the ventral tegmental area of Tsai, or simply ventral tegmentum, is a group of neurons located close to the midline on the floor of the midbrain.
腹侧被盖区和海马体在解剖结构和功能上有什么联系？
ChatGPT：
腹侧被盖区 (VTA) 和海马体在解剖结构和功能上有重要的联系，主要通过它们在神经回路中的相互作用来调控情绪、记忆和奖赏行为。解剖结构上的联系
多巴胺神经元投射：VTA 是大脑中多巴胺神经元的主要来源之一。这些神经元从 VTA 投射到多个大脑区域，包括海马体。特别是，VTA 的多巴胺神经元通过中脑边缘通路向海马体的前海马皮层 (ventral hippocampus) 投射。
反馈回路：海马体也通过神经回路与 VTA 互相联系。海马体可以通过中介区域（如伏隔核和前额叶皮层）影响 VTA 的活动。这种反馈回路对于调节情绪、记忆以及与奖赏相关的行为非常重要。
功能上的联系
情绪调节：VTA 的多巴胺投射与海马体的相互作用对于情绪的调控至关重要。VTA 通过释放多巴胺影响海马体的活动，从而影响与情绪相关的记忆形成和调节。
奖赏和动机：VTA 是大脑奖赏系统的核心部分，负责处理奖励信号和动机。海马体在这一过程中起到支持作用，帮助整合与奖励相关的记忆和情境信息，从而增强对奖励的预期和动机行为。
记忆的调节：多巴胺在海马体中的作用对于长期记忆的形成尤其重要。VTA 的多巴胺释放可以增强海马体中的突触可塑性，从而有助于巩固新记忆，特别是那些与情绪和奖励相关的记忆。
总体而言，VTA 和海马体之间的联系对于理解大脑如何整合情绪、记忆和奖励信息，以产生适应性行为具有重要意义。
第二章 『负罪』、『良心谴责』及其它
Second essay: ‘Guilt’, ‘bad conscience’ and related matters
五 早期契约与补偿中的残酷角色
5 The Role of Cruelty in Early Contracts and Compensation
确实，思考这些契约关系，如前所述，会引发对创造或允许它们的原始人的各种怀疑和敌意。正是在这里，做出承诺；正是在这里，做出承诺的人必须有一个为其量身定制的记忆：正是在这里，我们可以假设存在一个充满严酷、残忍和痛苦的存储库。为了让债务人履行还款的承诺，给出承诺的庄严性和神圣性保证，并将还款的义务铭刻在他的良心中，债务人通过合同将他仍然‘拥有’和控制的东西，例如他的身体、妻子、自由或生命，甚至在某些宗教环境下，甚至他的来世、灵魂的救赎，最终甚至是坟墓中的安宁（例如在埃及，债务人的尸体即使在坟墓中也不得安宁——这种安宁对埃及人来说意义重大）。但特别是，债权人可以对债务人的身体施加各种耻辱和折磨，例如，切割债务人身体上的肉块以抵偿债务——从这个角度来看，早期的法律估价详细而恐怖地列出了个体四肢和身体部位的估价。我认为这是进步的明确证据，是一种更自由、更慷慨的计算，罗马式的公正定价，当罗马的《十二表法》规定，在这种情况下债权人切割多少都无关紧要时，‘si plus minusve secuerunt, ne fraude esto’｛‘如果切割多了或少了，不应视为犯罪。’这出自《第三表》，第6节。现代版本中对此有略微不同的文本，‘se’（= sine）代替‘ne’：‘如果他们多切或少切，都应诚实进行。’｝让我们明确这一补偿问题的逻辑：相当奇怪。等价的提供是，通过给予债权人一种补偿，即享有对无助者施加权力的乐趣，享受‘de faire le mal pour le plaisir de le faire’｛P. Mérimée, 《给陌生人的信》（巴黎，1874），I. 8：‘为了做恶而做恶的乐趣’｝，这是在社会等级较低和卑微的债权人身上尤其被珍视的享受，甚至可能被视为对更高地位的前奏。通过惩罚债务人，债权人参与了主人的权利：最终他也共享了那种可以蔑视和虐待‘下等者’的高尚感觉——或者至少，当实际的惩罚权力已经转移给‘当局’时，看到债务人被蔑视和虐待。因此，补偿成为了对残酷的担保和权利。
To be sure, thinking about these contractual relationships, as can be expected from what has gone before, arouses all kinds of suspicion and hostility towards the primitive men who created them or permitted them. Precisely here, promises are made; precisely here, the person making the promise has to have a memory made for him: precisely here, we may suppose, is a repository of hard, cruel, painful things. The debtor, in order to inspire confidence that the promise of repayment will be honoured, in order to give a guarantee of the solemnity and sanctity of his promise, and in order to etch the duty and obligation of repayment into his conscience, pawns something to the creditor by means of the contract in case he does not pay, something that he still ‘possesses’ and controls, for example, his body, or his wife, or his freedom, or his life (or, in certain religious circumstances, even his after-life, the salvation of his soul, finally, even his peace in the grave: as in Egypt, where the corpse of a debtor found no peace from the creditor even in the grave – and this peace meant a lot precisely to the Egyptians). But in particular, the creditor could inflict all kinds of dishonour and torture on the body of the debtor, for example, cutting as much flesh off as seemed appropriate for the debt: – from this standpoint there were everywhere, early on, estimates which went into horrifyingly minute and fastidious detail, legally drawn up estimates for individual limbs and parts of the body. I regard it as definite progress and proof of a freer, more open-handed calculation, of a more Roman pricing of justice, when Rome’s code of the Twelve Tables decreed that it did not matter how much or how little a creditor cut off in such a circumstance, ‘si plus minusve secuerunt, ne fraude esto’. ｛‘If they have cut off more or less, let that not be considered a crime.’ This is from the Third Table, section 6. Modern editions read a slightly different text here with ‘se’ (= sine) for ‘ne’: ‘If they have cut off more or less, let it be honestly done.’｝ Let’s be quite clear about the logic of this whole matter of compensation: it is strange enough. The equivalence is provided by the fact that instead of an advantage directly making up for the wrong (so, instead of compensation in money, land or possessions of any kind), a sort of pleasure is given to the creditor as repayment and compensation, – the pleasure of having the right to exercise power over the powerless without a thought, the pleasure ‘de faire le mal pour le plaisir de le faire’, ｛P. Mérimée, Lettres à une inconnue (Paris, 1874), I. 8: ‘To do evil for the pleasure of doing it’.｝ the enjoyment of violating: an enjoyment that is prized all the higher, the lower and baser the position of the creditor in the social scale, and which can easily seem a delicious titbit to him, even a foretaste of higher rank. Through punishment of the debtor, the creditor takes part in the rights of the masters: at last he, too, shares the elevated feeling of being in a position to despise and maltreat someone as an ‘inferior’ – or at least, when the actual power of punishment, of exacting punishment, is already transferred to the ‘authorities’, of seeing the debtor despised and maltreated. So, then, compensation is made up of a warrant for and entitlement to cruelty. –
六 债务、痛苦与残酷的持续联系
6 The Persistent Link Between Debt, Suffering, and Cruelty
在这种法律义务的领域中，‘债务’、‘良心’、‘责任’、‘神圣责任’的道德概念世界就有了其孕育之地——所有伟大事物的开始都伴随着彻底而持久的血腥，就像地球上所有伟大事物的起源一样。我们是否可以补充说，这个世界从未真正摆脱过某种血腥和折磨的气息？（即使在老康德那里：道德法则也散发着残酷的气息……）。同样，正是在这里，‘债务与痛苦’的概念之间的奇异且可能无法分解的联系第一次被缝合在一起。我再次问：痛苦在多大程度上可以作为‘债务’的补偿？在于使人受苦是最高形式的快乐，以及受害方从伤害和痛苦中获得了非凡的反向快乐：使人受苦——一种真正的盛宴，正如我提到的，当它与债权人的地位和社会位置形成对比时，其价格越高。所有这些我都是在推测中说的：因为这些地下的事情难以深究，并且令人尴尬；任何笨拙地插入‘报复’概念的人只会模糊和遮蔽自己的洞察，而非澄清它（——报复本身只是把我们带回同样的问题：‘为什么使人受苦会让人感到满足？’）。在我看来，那些温顺的家宠（即现代人，即我们）的精致甚至伪善对古人庆祝快乐中残酷的程度感到反感，对他们几乎所有快乐的组成部分进行真正强力的认识：另一方面，他们对残酷的需求显得多么天真无邪，这种‘无私的恶意’（或用斯宾诺莎的话说，就是‘恶意的同情’）被假定为正常的人类属性——让良心对此给出热烈的‘是’！一个更敏锐的眼睛或许仍能发现这些最原始和基本的人类节日快乐；在《超越善恶》第七章229节中，我指着知识化和‘神化’残酷的趋势，这一趋势贯穿了整个高级文化历史（并在重要意义上构成了它）。无论如何，不久前，没有刑罚、折磨或审判火刑，举行一场皇家婚礼或大规模的民间节日是不可想象的；同样，没有人能在贵族家庭中没有可以任意发泄恶意和残酷嘲弄的生物（例如《堂吉诃德》中对公爵夫人的宫廷中的场景：今天我们阅读整部《堂吉诃德》时，嘴里有苦味，这对作者和他的 contemporaries 来说几乎是一个折磨——他们阅读时怀着清晰的良心，将其视为最有趣的书籍，使他们几乎笑得肚子疼）。看到痛苦令人愉快，使人受苦更令人愉快——这是一个艰难的命题，但古老而强大的、过于人类的命题，顺便说一句，连猿类也可能会认同：正如人们所说，设想奇异的残酷行为，它们预测并‘演示’了人类将会做的事。没有残酷，就没有盛宴：这是人类历史上最古老和最长的时期教给我们的——而惩罚也具有非常强烈的节日特性！
In this sphere of legal obligations, then, the moral conceptual world of ‘debt’, ‘conscience’, ‘duty’, ‘sacred duty’, has its breeding ground – all began with a thorough and prolonged bloodletting, like the beginning of all great things on earth. And may we not add that this world has really never quite lost a certain odour of blood and torture? (not even with old Kant: the categorical imperative smells of cruelty …). In the same way, it was here that the uncanny and perhaps inextricable link-up between the ideas of ‘debt and suffering’ was first crocheted together. I ask again: to what extent can suffering be a compensation for ‘debts’? To the degree that to make someone suffer is pleasure in its highest form, and to the degree that the injured party received an extraordinary counter-pleasure in exchange for the injury and distress caused by the injury: to make someone suffer, – a true feast, something that, as I mentioned, rose in price the more it contrasted with the rank and social position of the creditor. I say all this in speculation: because such subterranean things are difficult to fathom out, besides being embarrassing; and anyone who clumsily tries to interject the concept ‘revenge’ has merely obscured and darkened his own insight, rather than clarified it (– revenge itself just leads us back to the same problem: ‘how can it be gratifying to make someone suffer?’). It seems to me that the delicacy and even more the tartuffery of tame house-pets (meaning modern man, meaning us) revolts against a truly forceful realization of the degree to which cruelty is part of the festive joy of the ancients and, indeed, is an ingredient in nearly every pleasure they have; on the other hand, how naïve and innocent their need for cruelty appears, and how fundamental is that ‘disinterested malice’ (or, to use Spinoza’s words, the sympathia malevolens) they assume is a normal human attribute –: making it something to which conscience says a hearty ‘yes’! A more piercing eye would perhaps be able to detect, even now, plenty of these most primitive and basic festive joys of man; in Beyond Good and Evil, VII, section 229 ｛See below, Supplementary material, pp. 153–4.｝ (earlier in Daybreak, I, sections 18, 77, 113) ｛See below, Supplementary material, pp. 137–9, pp. 140–1, pp. 143–4.｝ I pointed a wary finger at the ever-growing intellectualization and ‘deification’ of cruelty, which runs though the whole history of higher culture (and indeed, constitutes it in an important sense). At all events, not so long ago it was unthinkable to hold a royal wedding or full-scale festival for the people without executions, tortures or perhaps an auto-da-fé, similarly, no noble household was without creatures on whom people could discharge their malice and cruel taunts with impunity (remember Don Quixote, for example, at the court of the Duchess: ｛Don Quixote, Book II, chs 31–7.｝ today we read the whole of Don Quixote with a bitter taste in the mouth, it is almost an ordeal, which would make us seem very strange and incomprehensible to the author and his contemporaries, – they read it with a clear conscience as the funniest of books, it made them nearly laugh themselves to death). To see suffering does you good, to make suffer, better still – that is a hard proposition, but an ancient, powerful, human-all-too-human proposition to which, by the way, even the apes might subscribe: as people say, in thinking up bizarre cruelties they anticipate and, as it were, act out a ‘demonstration’ of what man will do. No cruelty, no feast: that is what the oldest and longest period in human history teaches us – and punishment, too, has such very strong festive aspects! –
十五 斯宾诺莎对良心与惩罚效果的反思
15 Spinoza’s Reflection on Conscience and the Effects of Punishment
斯宾诺莎以一种让他显露真面目的方式（令他的批评者感到不满，他们有系统地在这一点上误解他，例如库诺·费舍尔）意识到了这一点。当时，他在某个下午翻阅着不知道是什么回忆，注意到那个著名的良心的刺痛｛morsus conscientiae｝对他自己究竟还有什么意义——他将善与恶归于人的想象，并愤怒地捍卫他“自由”之神的荣誉，反对那些声称上帝的一切行为都是为了达到某种善目的亵渎者（“但这将意味着上帝受命运支配，这实际上是最大的荒谬”）。对斯宾诺莎来说，世界回到了发明良心谴责之前的那种无罪状态：那么良心的刺痛变成了什么？他最终对自己说：“欢乐的对立面”，一种伴随着对过去事件的想法的悲伤，而这些事件的结果与预期相反。对于数千年来因惩罚而被逮住的做错事的人来说，他们对自己的“罪行”感受与斯宾诺莎并无不同：“这里发生了一些意外”，而不是“我不应该这样做”——他们接受惩罚就像接受疾病或不幸或死亡一样，带着那种勇敢的、顺从的宿命论，这使得俄罗斯人（例如）在处理生活方式上比我们西方人有优势。如果在那时对行为有任何批评，它来自于智慧，智慧进行批评：我们必须首先寻找惩罚的实际效果，主要在于智慧的提升，记忆的延长，意愿变得更谨慎，更少信任，从现在起更周到地处理事情，在认识到自己对于许多事情来说，始终是太弱了的某种自我评价的改进。惩罚在很大程度上可以在人与动物身上实现的是恐惧的增加，智慧的增强，欲望的掌控：惩罚以这种方式驯服了人，但并没有使他“更好”——我们更有理由断言相反的事情。（“你可以从错误中学习”这句谚语所说的，但你学到的东西也使你变坏。幸运的是，它经常使你变得愚蠢。）
Spinoza became aware of this in a way that made him show his true colours (to the annoyance of his critics, who systematically attempt to misunderstand him on this point, Kuno Fischer, ｛Cf. his Geschichte der neueren Philosophie (Heidelberg, 1865), 1.2.｝ for example), when, one afternoon, rummaging around among who knows what memories, he turned his attention to the question of what actually remained for him, himself, of that famous morsus conscientiae ｛‘bite of conscience’. Cf. Spinoza, Ethics III, Definitions XVI, XVII, XXVI.｝ – he who had relegated good and evil to man’s imagination and angrily defended the honour of his ‘free’ God against the blasphemists who asserted that God operates everything sub ratione boni ｛‘to attain some good’.｝ (‘but that would mean that God is subject to fate and would really be the greatest of all absurdities’ –). ｛Spinoza, Ethics Proposition II scholium 2.｝ For Spinoza, the world had returned to that state of innocence in which it had lain before the invention of bad conscience: what had then become of morsus conscientiae? ‘The opposite of gaudium’, ｛‘gladness’.｝ he finally said to himself, ‘– a sadness accompanied by the notion of a past event which turned out contrary to expectation.’ Eth iii, Propos. xviii Schol. i ii. For millennia, wrong-doers overtaken by punishment have felt no different than Spinoza with regard to their ‘offence’: ‘something has gone unexpectedly wrong here’, not ‘I ought not to have done that’ –, they submitted to punishment as you submit to illness or misfortune or death, with that brave, unrebellious fatalism that still gives the Russians, for example, an advantage over us Westerners in the way they handle life. If, in those days, there was any criticism of the deed, it came from intelligence, which practised criticism: we must certainly seek the actual effect of punishment primarily in the sharpening of intelligence, in a lengthening of the memory, in a will to be more cautious, less trusting, to go about things more circumspectly from now on, in the recognition that one was, once and for all, too weak for many things, in a sort of improvement of self-assessment. What can largely be achieved by punishment, in man or beast, is the increase of fear, the intensification of intelligence, the mastering of desires: punishment tames man in this way but does not make him ‘better’, – we would be more justified in asserting the opposite. (‘You can learn from your mistakes’ as the saying goes, but what you learn also makes you bad. Fortunately it often enough makes you stupid.)
十六 罪恶感的起源：从原始本能到内心挣扎
16 The Emergence of Bad Conscience: From Primal Instincts to Internal Struggle
在这一点上，我不得不给出我自己关于“良心谴责”起源的初步表达：要让这种假设被听取并不容易，它需要被思考、观察和消化。我把良心谴责视为一种严重的疾病，人类在经历最根本的变化压力下不得不屈服——这种变化使他最终发现自己被困在社会与和平的约束中。对那些半动物来说，这种变化无异于海洋生物被迫成为陆地动物或灭绝——一下子，所有本能都被贬值和“悬置”。现在他们必须用双脚行走和“支撑自己”，而此前他们是被水托起来的：一种可怕的沉重感压在他们身上。他们觉得自己在执行最简单的任务时笨拙无比，没有了熟悉的引导者来引领他们进入这个新的、未知的世界，那些无意识地将他们引向安全的调节冲动——可怜的家伙们不得不依赖思考、推论、计算和因果联系，即依赖他们那个最贫困和错误率最高的器官“意识”！我不认为地球上曾经有过如此的苦难感，如此沉重的不适感——而与此同时，旧的本能并没有突然停止它们的需求！但要满足这些需求却是困难的，甚至很少可能：它们主要不得不寻找新的，可以说是地下的满足方式。所有未向外发泄的本能都会转向内部——这就是我所谓的人类内化：随着它，人类身上进化出了后来被称为他的“灵魂”的东西。整个内心世界，最初像是在两层皮肤之间薄薄地拉伸开来，随着人的本能外在发泄的受阻，扩展和延展，获得了深度、广度和高度。那些国家组织用来保护自己免受旧的自由本能侵袭的可怕堡垒——惩罚就是这种堡垒的主要例子——导致所有那些自由、游荡、冒险的人的本能都被转向对付他自己。这种敌意、残忍、追逐、袭击、改变和毁灭的快感——所有这些都被指向了拥有这种本能的人：这就是良心谴责的起源。缺乏外部敌人和障碍，并被迫进入压抑的狭隘和习俗的统一中，人类急躁地撕裂自己，迫害自己，啃噬自己，不给自己和平并虐待自己，这个动物在笼子的栏杆上把自己打得伤痕累累，被期望“驯服”；人类，充满空虚并因思乡病撕裂，不得不从自己内在创造出冒险，一个刑讯室，一个不安全和危险的荒野——这个傻瓜，这个充满渴望和绝望的囚犯，成了良心谴责的发明者。然而，随着它，最糟糕和最狡猾的疾病被引入了，一个人类尚未恢复的疾病；人类对人类的病，对自己的病：由于与他的动物过去的强行决裂，同时跃入和坠入新的生存环境和条件，一场对所有曾经是他的力量、快乐和可怕基础的旧本能的宣战。让我们立即补充道，另一方面，动物的灵魂对自己进行反对、对自己采取立场的前景是如此新颖、深刻、前所未有、令人困惑和意义深远，以至于世界的整个性质以一种本质的方式发生了变化。确实，需要一个神圣的观众来欣赏那时开始的奇观，而这种奇观的结束尚未出现——一个太微妙、太奇妙、太矛盾和意义深远的奇观，不允许在某个可笑的星球上无意义地上演！从那时起，人类被纳入赫拉克利特的“伟大的孩子”的最意外和最激动人心的骰子游戏之中，不管你叫他宙斯还是命运——他为自己激起了兴趣、紧张、希望，几乎是确信，仿佛通过他某种东西正在被宣布，正在准备，仿佛人类不是一个终点，而只是一个路径，一个插曲，一个桥梁，一个伟大的承诺……
At this point I can no longer avoid giving a first, preliminary expression to my own theory on the origin of ‘bad conscience’: it is not easy to get a hearing for this hypothesis and it needs to be pondered, watched and slept on. I look on bad conscience as a serious illness to which man was forced to succumb by the pressure of the most fundamental of all changes which he experienced, – that change whereby he finally found himself imprisoned within the confines of society and peace. It must have been no different for these semi-animals, happily adapted to the wilderness, war, the wandering life and adventure than it was for the sea animals when they were forced to either become land animals or perish – at one go, all instincts were devalued and ‘suspended’. Now they had to walk on their feet and ‘carry themselves’, whereas they had been carried by the water up till then: a terrible heaviness bore down on them. They felt they were clumsy at performing the simplest task, they did not have their familiar guide any more for this new, unknown world, those regulating impulses that unconsciously led them to safety – the poor things were reduced to relying on thinking, inference, calculation, and the connecting of cause with effect, that is, to relying on their ‘consciousness’, that most impoverished and error-prone organ! I do not think there has ever been such a feeling of misery on earth, such a leaden discomfort, – and meanwhile, the old instincts had not suddenly ceased to make their demands! But it was difficult and seldom possible to give in to them: they mainly had to seek new and as it were underground gratifications. All instincts which are not discharged outwardly turn inwards – this is what I call the internalization of man: with it there now evolves in man what will later be called his ‘soul’. The whole inner world, originally stretched thinly as though between two layers of skin, was expanded and extended itself and gained depth, breadth and height in proportion to the degree that the external discharge of man’s instincts was obstructed. Those terrible bulwarks with which state organizations protected themselves against the old instincts of freedom – punishments are a primary instance of this kind of bulkwark – had the result that all those instincts of the wild, free, roving man were turned backwards, against man himself. Animosity, cruelty, the pleasure of pursuing, raiding, changing and destroying – all this was pitted against the person who had such instincts: that is the origin of ‘bad conscience’. Lacking external enemies and obstacles, and forced into the oppressive narrowness and conformity of custom, man impatiently ripped himself apart, persecuted himself, gnawed at himself, gave himself no peace and abused himself, this animal who battered himself raw on the bars of his cage and who is supposed to be ‘tamed’; man, full of emptiness and torn apart with homesickness for the desert, has had to create from within himself an adventure, a torture-chamber, an unsafe and hazardous wilderness – this fool, this prisoner consumed with longing and despair, became the inventor of ‘bad conscience’. With it, however, the worst and most insidious illness was introduced, one from which mankind has not yet recovered; man’s sickness of man, of himself: as the result of a forcible breach with his animal past, a simultaneous leap and fall into new situations and conditions of existence, a declaration of war against all the old instincts on which, up till then, his strength, pleasure and formidableness had been based. Let us immediately add that, on the other hand, the prospect of an animal soul turning against itself, taking a part against itself, was something so new, profound, unheard-of, puzzling, contradictory and momentous ［Zukunftsvolles］ on earth that the whole character of the world changed in an essential way. Indeed, a divine audience was needed to appreciate the spectacle that began then, but the end of which is not yet in sight, – a spectacle too subtle, too wonderful, too paradoxical to be allowed to be played senselessly unobserved on some ridiculous planet! Since that time, man has been included among the most unexpected and exciting throws of dice played by Heraclitus’ ‘great child’, call him Zeus or fate, ｛Heraclitus, Fragment 52.｝ – he arouses interest, tension, hope, almost certainty for himself, as though something were being announced through him, were being prepared, as though man were not an end but just a path, an episode, a bridge, a great promise …
良心谴责的起源：爱的本能、勇敢的刚强向外受阻；恐惧的软弱、恨的本能向内沉积。
埃及人不过是人，并不是神；
他们的马不过是血肉，并不是灵；
永恒主一伸手，那帮助人的就绊跌，
那受帮助的也必跌倒，
二者就同归于尽。
(以赛亚书 31:3 吕振中)
人不过是人，人会困倦，人会疲乏。
人不过是人，有错的人，有罪的人。
十九 罪恶意识与神灵崇拜的起源与发展
19 The Origin and Development of Guilt Consciousness and Divine Worship
良心谴责是一种疾病，这一点无可否认，但它更像怀孕那样的疾病。让我们来研究一下这种疾病在何种条件下达到了其最可怕和崇高的顶点：我们将看到这种现象真正进入世界的情形。但我们需要极大的耐力——首先，我们必须回到更早的一个点。我已经详尽写过的民法中债务人与债权人之间的关系，在历史上以一种极其奇特的方式，再次通过解释转变成了一种关系，这种关系对我们现代人来说也许最难以理解：那就是现今一代人与他们的祖先之间的关系。在原始部落的联结中——我们讨论的是远古时代——活着的一代人总是承认他们对早先一代人，尤其是对创立部落的最早一代人负有法律责任（这不仅仅是一种感情上的联系：事实上，这种感情联系在相当长的人类历史时期内完全可以被合理否认）。普遍存在的信念是，部落的存在完全归因于祖先的牺牲和功绩——这些必须通过牺牲和功绩来偿还：人们认识到一种不断增加的负债［Schuld］，因为这些祖先继续作为强大的灵魂存在，赋予部落新的优势，并将他们的一部分力量传递给部落。他们这样做难道是出于无偿的吗？但在那些粗野且“精神贫乏”的时代里，没有“无偿”这一说法。人们能拿什么来回报他们呢？牺牲（最初的牺牲是作为最粗陋意义上的食物），节日，祭坛，贡品，最重要的是，服从——因为所有的传统，作为祖先的作品，也是他们的规则和命令——：人们真的给他们足够多的东西了吗？这种怀疑依然存在并且不断增长：时不时地它要求一笔巨大的偿还，以偿还给“债权人”（例如臭名昭著的长子祭献，血祭，无论如何都是人血祭献）。沿着这条思路，随着对祖先及其力量的恐惧，对他们的债务意识不可避免地增加，这与部落自身力量的增加成正比，即部落自身变得越来越胜利、独立、受尊敬和受敬畏。并不是相反的情况！每一步走向部落的衰弱，每一次不幸的灾难，每一个退化和即将崩溃的迹象，总是减弱而不是增加对其创始人精神的恐惧，并导致对其智慧、预见力和强大存在的评价逐渐降低。如果你把这种粗暴的逻辑思考到极致：通过这种不断增长的恐惧的幻觉，最强大部落的祖先必定会膨胀到巨大的体量，并且被推向神秘和超越的幽暗中：——祖先自己最终不可避免地被升华为神。也许我们在这里看到了神的实际起源，那么，起源于恐惧！……如果有人认为‘但也出于虔诚！’的话，在人类历史上最漫长的时期，即史前时期，很难为这一观点找到合理的依据。然而，在贵族部落发展的中期，他的观点反而更加正确：——这些部落确实偿还了他们的创始人、他们的祖先（英雄、神灵）的债务，并且还带利息，用所有在他们身上已经显现出来的贵族品质来偿还。稍后，我们将再度回顾神灵是如何被尊崇和提升的过程（这完全不同于说他们被‘圣化’）：但目前，让我们继续探讨这种罪恶意识发展的全过程，直到它的最终结局。
Bad conscience is a sickness, there is no point in denying it, but a sickness rather like pregnancy. Let us examine the conditions under which this sickness reached its most terrible and sublime peak: – we shall see what, with this, really entered the world. But we shall need a great deal of staying power, – and first we have to return to an earlier point. The relationship of a debtor to his creditor in civil law, about which I have written at length already, was for a second time transformed through interpretation, in a historically extremely strange and curious manner, into a relationship in which it is perhaps least comprehensible to us modern men: that is the relationship of the present generation to their forebears. Within the original tribal association – we are talking about primeval times – the living generation always acknowledged a legal obligation towards the earlier generation, and in particular towards the earliest, which founded the tribe (and this was not just a sentimental tie: this latter could, with good reason, be denied altogether for the longest period of the human race). There is a prevailing conviction that the tribe exists only because of the sacrifices and deeds of the forefathers, – and that these have to be paid back with sacrifices and deeds: people recognize an indebtedness ［Schuld］, which continually increases because these ancestors continue to exist as mighty spirits, giving the tribe new advantages and lending it some of their power. Do they do this for nothing, perhaps? But there is no ‘for nothing’ for those raw and ‘spiritually impoverished’ ages. What can people give them in return? Sacrifices (originally as food in the crudest sense), feasts, chapels, tributes, above all, obedience – for all traditions are, as works of the ancestors, also their rules and orders –: do people ever give them enough? This suspicion remains and grows: from time to time it exacts a payment on a grand scale, something immense as a repayment to the ‘creditor’ (the infamous sacrifice of the first-born, for example, blood, human blood in any case). Following this line of thought, the dread of the ancestor and his power, the consciousness of debts towards him, increases inevitably, in direct proportion to the increase in power of the tribe itself, that is, in proportion as the tribe itself becomes ever more victorious, independent, honoured and feared. And not the other way round! Every step towards the weakening of the tribe, all unfortunate calamities, all signs of degeneration and imminent disintegration, always lessen rather than increase the dread of the spirit of its founder, and lead to an ever lower opinion of his sagacity, providence and powerful presence. If you think this sort of crude logic through to the end: it follows that through the hallucination of the growing dread itself, the ancestors of the most powerful tribes must have grown to an immense stature and must have been pushed into the obscurity of divine mystery and transcendence: – inevitably the ancestor himself is finally transfigured into a god. Perhaps we have here the actual origin of gods, an origin, then, in fear! … And whoever should deem fit to add: ‘but in piety, too!’ would have difficulty in justifying the claim for the longest period of the human race, prehistory. All the more so, however, would he be right, for the middle period in which the noble tribes developed: – who actually did repay, with interest, their founders, their ancestors (heroes, gods) with all the attributes which, in the meantime, had become manifest in themselves, the noble attributes. Later, we shall take another look at the way gods are ennobled and exalted (which is not at all to say they were ‘hallowed’): but let us, for the present, pursue the course of this whole development of the consciousness of guilt to its conclusion.
难道「最强大的部落」会由「软弱无力的奴隶」组成吗？
二十一 罪责与宗教戒律的道德化：从良心谴责到神圣自我牺牲的转变
21 The Moralization of Guilt and Duty: From Bad Conscience to Divine Self-Sacrifice
至此，我们对‘债务/罪责’与‘责任’及宗教戒律之间关系的简要而粗略的初步概述就到这里为止了：到目前为止，我故意将这些概念的真正道德化（即它们被推回到良心中；更确切地说，是良心谴责与上帝的概念交织在一起的方式）搁置在一旁，并且在上一节的结尾，我实际上是以这些概念的道德化不存在的方式说话的，因此，好像一旦基本前提不再适用——我们对我们的‘债权人’上帝的信任，这些概念必然会消失。然而，事实却以一种可怕的方式偏离了这一点。随着‘债务/罪责’和‘责任’概念的道德化以及它们被归入良心谴责，我们实际上看到了一个试图逆转我所描述的发展方向的尝试，或者至少是阻止其发展的尝试：现在，出于悲观主义的缘故，一次性还清债务的前景被彻底关闭，现在我们的目光绝望地在一个铁定的不可能性上反弹，现在这些‘债务’和‘责任’的概念被颠倒了——但这是针对谁的呢？毫无疑问：首先是针对‘债务人’，良心谴责现在如此牢固地在他身上扎根，侵蚀他，扩展和生长，像一个水螅，变得如此广阔和深远，以至于最终随着无法偿还债务的可能性出现了无法完成赎罪的概念，无法偿还的想法（‘永罚’）；最终，这也针对‘债权人’，在这里我们应该想到人类的根本原因，人类的起源，他的祖先现在背负着诅咒（‘亚当’，‘原罪’，‘意志的奴役’），或者是自然，人在其中诞生，并将罪恶的原则归咎于它（自然的妖魔化），或者是一般存在，最终被认为是本质上毫无价值的（对存在的虚无主义的背离，渴望虚无或渴望‘对立面’，成为他物，如佛教等）——直到，我们突然面对一个矛盾且恐怖的应急措施，通过这个措施，一个受难的人类寻求暂时的救赎，基督教的天才之作：没有别的，正是上帝为了人类的债务牺牲了自己，正是上帝偿还了自己，只有上帝能够赎回对人类而言已无可挽回的东西——债权人为了他的债务人牺牲了自己，出于爱（你能相信吗？——），出于对他的债务人的爱！……
So much for a brief and rough preliminary outline of the connection between the concepts ‘debt/guilt’ and ‘duty’ and religious precepts: I have so far intentionally set aside the actual moralization of these concepts (the way they are pushed back into conscience; more precisely, the way bad conscience is woven together with the concept of God), and at the conclusion of the last section I actually spoke as though this moralization did not exist, consequently, as though these concepts would necessarily come to an end once the basic premise no longer applied, the credence we lend our ‘creditor’, God. The facts diverge from this in a terrible way. With the moralization of the concepts debt/guilt and duty and their relegation to bad conscience, we have, in reality, an attempt to reverse the direction of the development I have described, or at least halt its movement: now the prospect for a once-and-for-all payment is to be foreclosed, out of pessimism, now our glance is to bounce and recoil disconsolately off an iron impossibility, now those concepts ‘debt’ and ‘duty’ are to be reversed – but against whom? It is indisputable: firstly against the ‘debtor’, in whom bad conscience now so firmly establishes itself, eating into him, broadening out and growing, like a polyp, so wide and deep that in the end, with the impossibility of paying back the debt, is conceived the impossibility of discharging the penance, the idea that it cannot be paid off (‘eternal punishment’); ultimately, however, against the ‘creditor’, and here we should think of the causa prima of man, the beginning of the human race, of his ancestor who is now burdened with a curse (‘Adam’, ‘original sin’, ‘the will in bondage’), or of nature, from whose womb man originated and to whom the principle of evil is imputed (diabolization of nature), or of existence in general, which is left standing as inherently worthless (a nihilistic turning-away from existence, the desire for nothingness or desire for the ‘antithesis’, to be other, Buddhism and such like) – until, all at once, we confront the paradoxical and horrifying expedient through which a martyred humanity has sought temporary relief, Christianity’s stroke of genius: none other than God sacrificing himself for man’s debt, none other than God paying himself back, God as the only one able to redeem man from what, to man himself, has become irredeemable – the creditor sacrificing himself for his debtor, out of love (would you credit it? –), out of love for his debtor! …
二十三 希腊神祇与基督教神观的对比：从愚蠢到神秘的罪责解释
23 A Comparison of Greek Deities and Christian Theology: From Foolishness to Mystical Guilt Explanation
关于“圣神”的降临，我们已经说得够多了——这段内容就此为止。——神的概念本身并不必然导致我们一度不得不考虑的想象力的恶化；事实上，发明神灵有比人类的自我折磨和自我摧残更高尚的用途，而欧洲在过去的几千年里恰好在这些方面表现得尤为出色——这一点可以从对希腊神灵的任何一瞥中得出结论。这些希腊神灵是高贵而自豪的人的映像，在他们身上，人类的动物性得到了神化，而不是自我撕裂或自我摧残！大多数时候，这些希腊人明确地利用他们的神灵来阻挡‘良心谴责’，以便他们能够继续享受心灵的自由：因此，这与基督教利用其上帝的方式截然相反。这些奇妙的、勇敢的孩子们在这方面做得非常彻底；甚至连荷马的宙斯这样的重要人物也让他们明白，他们这样做未免太容易了。‘奇怪！’，他在一次谈话中说道——他在谈论埃吉斯托斯的案例，一个非常糟糕的案例——
奇怪的是，凡人们竟然如此抱怨众神！他们声称只有我们带来了罪恶，但事实上，他们自己通过愚蠢的行为带来了痛苦，甚至与命运相悖！｛《奥德赛》第一卷，第32到34行｝
然而，我们可以立即听到并看到，即使是这位奥林匹斯的观察者和审判者也无意对此怀有怨恨或对凡人心生恶意：‘他们多么愚蠢啊’，这是他对凡人行为不端时的想法——‘愚蠢’，‘愚昧’，一点‘精神错乱’，即使是强大而勇敢的希腊人也允许自己用这些理由来解释许多恶行或灾难：——愚蠢，不是罪！你懂吗？……但即使这种精神错乱也是一个问题——‘是的，这怎么可能？像我们这样高贵出身的人，幸福、天赋优越、高贵且有德行的人，怎么会发生这样的事情？’——几个世纪以来，每当看到同伴沾染上不可理解的暴行或罪行时，贵族的希腊人都会这样问自己。‘一定是神让他迷惑了’，最后，他摇着头自言自语道……这种解决方案对希腊人来说是典型的……通过这种方式，神灵在某种程度上为人类辩护，即使他们犯了错误，神灵也作为罪恶的起因——当时他们并不承担惩罚，而是更高尚地承担了罪责……
That should be enough, once and for all, about the descent of the ‘holy God’. – That the conception of gods does not, as such, necessarily lead to that deterioration of the imagination which we had to think about for a moment, that there are nobler ways of making use of the invention of gods than man’s self-crucifixion and self-abuse, ways in which Europe excelled during the last millennia, – this can fortunately be deduced from any glance at the Greek gods, these reflections of noble and proud men in whom the animal in man felt deified, did not tear itself apart and did not rage against itself! These Greeks, for most of the time, used their gods expressly to keep ‘bad conscience’ at bay so that they could carry on enjoying their freedom of soul: therefore, the opposite of the way Christendom made use of its God. They went very far in this, these marvellous, lion-hearted children; and no less an authority than the Homeric Zeus gives them to understand that they are making it too easy for themselves. ‘Strange!’, he says on one occasion – he is talking about the case of Aegisthus, a very bad case –
Strange how much the mortals complain about the gods! We alone cause evil, they claim, but they themselves, through folly, bring about their own distress, even contrary to fate! ｛Odyssey I. 32–4.｝
Yet we can immediately hear and see that even this Olympian observer and judge has no intention of bearing them a grudge for this and thinking ill of them: ‘How foolish they are’ is what he thinks when the mortals misbehave, – ‘foolishness’, ‘stupidity’, a little ‘mental disturbance’, this much even the Greeks of the strongest, bravest period allowed themselves as a reason for much that was bad or calamitous: – foolishness, not sin! you understand? … But even this mental disturbance was a problem – ‘Yes, how is this possible? Where can this have actually come from with minds like ours, we men of high lineage, happy, well-endowed, high-born, noble and virtuous?’ – for centuries, the noble Greek asked himself this in the face of any incomprehensible atrocity or crime with which one of his peers had sullied himself. ‘A god must have confused him’, he said to himself at last, shaking his head … This solution is typical for the Greeks … In this way, the gods served to justify man to a certain degree, even if he was in the wrong they served as causes of evil – they did not, at that time, take the punishment on themselves, but rather, as is nobler, the guilt …
尼采所谓的希腊式「治疗」就是：成为「贵族」——高傲地将自己的罪行彻底忽视并完全遗忘。
因此，所有的「奴隶」都没有「拯救」。
美国心理学家和哲学家威廉・詹姆士（William James）在《宗教心理种种》（The Varieties of Religious Experience）中将宗教体验分为几种类型，并且第一种类型宗教通常指的是『心情舒畅』或『健康心态』的宗教体验。这种类型的宗教体验往往被描述为一种积极、乐观、充满喜悦和希望的状态。詹姆士认为，这些信仰者感受到了一种与神圣或超自然力量的直接关系，使他们获得了内在的平静、幸福和安慰。
虽然我在那封信上使你们忧伤，但我现在并不后悔；其实我曾经有点后悔，因为知道那封信使你们忧伤，虽然只是暂时的。
现在我快乐，不是因为你们忧伤，而是因为你们的忧伤带来了悔改。你们依照 神的意思忧伤，凡事就不会因我们受到亏损。
因为依照 神的意思而有的忧伤，可以生出没有懊悔的悔改，以致得救；世俗的忧伤却会招致死亡。
看哪，你们依照 神的意思忧伤，在你们中间就产生了怎样的热情、申诉、愤慨、战兢、渴望、热诚、正义；你们在各方面都表明了自己在那事上是清白的。
(哥林多后书 7:8-11 新译本)
「悔改」的起源是什么？
「悔改」源于「被爱」吗？
恐惧的软弱、恨的本能向外受阻；爱的本能、勇敢的刚强向内沉积。
凡作恶的都恨光，不来接近光，免得他的恶行暴露出来。
(约翰福音 3:20 新译本)
你们每逢站着祷告的时候，若跟人有什么不对的事，总当饶恕他，好使你们在天上的父也饶恕你们的过犯。
(马可福音11:25 吕振中)
And when you stand praying, forgive, if you have anything against anyone, so that your Father who is in the heavens may also forgive you your offenses.
(Mark 11:25 Recovery Version)
狭隘的罪人不愿被人训诫也不能饶恕人。
第三章 禁欲主义理想意味着什么？
Third essay: what do ascetic ideals mean?
再版序言
Preface to the Revised Edition
三联书店的编辑朋友告诉我，尼采的《论道德的谱系》要再版，请我校订一下。再写个再版序言。这个突如其来的消息让我回想起30年前翻译尼采这本小书时的情景，确有恍若隔世的感觉。30年前我的名字叫『周红』，在尼采的《论道德的谱系》出版前后，我将『周红』改为了『周弘』，部分是为了和另外一位名为『周红』的哈佛留学生加以区别，部分也是要和我自己的人文的过去划一道界限。自从使用了『周弘』这个名字，我的写作大都偏于社会科学，而『人文的我』，包括儿时想当文学家的梦，就真的都成了过去。难为了编辑朋友，费了怎样一番周折才找到我，而我也应她的要求，用我现在的名字（也就是『周弘』）来再版这本译作，以表示对自己做过的工作终身负责的意思。全书译自 1980 年 Walterde Gruyter 德国口袋书出版社（Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag）出版的15卷本《尼采批判研究全集》中的第5卷（Friedrich Nietzsche Samtliche Werke Kritische Studienausgabe Band 5），再版校订仍然依据这个版本。
翻译尼采的《论道德的谱系》，并非因为我赞同或赞赏尼采的很多观点。恰恰相反，我虽然惊叹于尼采驾驭语言和剖析人性的能力，而且丝毫也不敢忽略他作为哲学家和学者在西方哲学和思想史中的地位，但是我此后的学术道路与尼采相去甚远。我承认，当年决定翻译尼采的《论道德的谱系》，其实是有几分青涩，也有几分炫技。大约35年前，何兆武先生到美国的布兰代斯大学访问，鼓励当时还是留学生的我翻译西方经典著作，我当时的选择是马克斯·韦伯的《新教伦理与资本主义精神》。何先生还对我说，一定要从德文直接翻译。不久，何先生来信说，《新教伦理与资本主义精神》一书已经有了译者，让我任选另外一本德文经典。我当时正在撰写硕士论文，题目是《鲁迅与尼采》。手头恰好有尼采的书，而且《论道德的谱系》篇幅又不长，既能够锻炼并证明我的德语翻译能力，又不会占据我太多的时间。后来的经历证明，我低估了这本书翻译的难度，而且因为有了炫技的成分和不够成熟的因素，动笔以后遇到重重困难是必然的，加上朋友们说我有那种『一定要用十二分的努力去做只需要五分努力就可以完成的工作』的性格，结果这本书的翻译成了『硬头皮工程』，从1986年一直干到了1988年，加上后来出版周期的影响，到了1992年才被三联书店出版。回想起来，从开始动笔翻译到现在，整整30年过去了。
一项工作经历了30年而依然保有价值，这本身是一件值得高兴的事，而我虽然说不上百感交集，但算得上是五味杂陈了。
朝觐(哈只)
26. 当时我曾为易卜拉欣指定天房的地址，我说：「你不要以任何物配我，你应当为环行者、立正者、鞠躬者和叩头者，打扫我的房屋。
27. 你应当在众人中宣告朝觐，他们就从远道或徒步或乘着瘦驼，到你这里来，
28. 以便他们见证他们所有的许多利益，并且在规定的若干日内，记念真主之名而屠宰他赐给他们的牲畜。」你们可以吃那些牲畜的肉，并且应当用来款待困苦的和贫穷的人。
29. 然后叫他们涤除他们的污垢，叫他们履行他们的誓愿，叫他们围绕那间古房而环行。
30. 事情就是这样的，谁尊重真主的戒律，在主的那里那对于谁是更好的。一切牲畜对你们都是合法的，对你们已宣布禁戒的除外。故你们应当避开污秽即偶像，应当永离妄语；
31. 同时为真主而信奉正教，不以物配他。谁以物配真主，谁如从天空坠落，而被群鸟夺走，或被大风扫荡到远方。
32. 事情就是这样的，谁尊敬真主的标识，那是心中的虔诚发出的。
33. 牲畜对于你们，有若干利益，至于一个定期，然后（屠宰牠们作供献）的合法地方应该是古房的附近。
34. 我为每个民族制定一种供献的仪式，以便他们记念真主之名而屠宰他所赐他们的牲畜。你们的神明是独一的神明，故你们应当只归顺他。你应当以喜讯传示谦恭者。
35. 当记念真主的时候，衷心感到恐惧者——感到战栗者——忍受苦难者、谨守拜功者、分舍我所赐之物者，
36. 我为你们以骆驼为真主的标志，牠们对于你们有许多用处；牠们排列成行的时候，你们应当为屠宰牠们而记念真主之名；当牠们侧卧在地上的时候，你们可以吃牠们的肉，并应当用来款待知足的贫民和乞讨的贫民。我为你们这样制服牠们，以便你们感谢。
37. 牠们的肉和血，都不能达到真主，但你们的虔诚，能达到他。他为你们这样制服牠们，以便你们为真主对你们的引导而尊崇他。你应当向行善者报喜。
——《古兰经》22:26-37
耶和华对摩西说：『你要告诉亚伦和他的儿子：赎罪祭的律例是这样：赎罪祭牲应在宰杀燔祭牲的地方，在耶和华面前宰杀，这是至圣的。献这赎罪祭的祭司要吃这祭牲；在会幕院子里的圣洁地方吃。接触过这祭肉的，必成为圣。沾了祭牲的血，必须清理；血溅在衣服上，应该在圣洁的地方洗净，煮祭物的瓦器却要打碎；如果煮祭物的是铜器，只需用水冲洗。祭司家中的男丁，都可以吃祭肉；这是至圣的。但是任何赎罪祭，如果它的血带进了会幕在圣所内进行赎罪，祭肉就不可吃；必须用火烧尽。』
(利未记 6:24-30 新译本)
『赎愆祭的律例是这样：这祭是至圣的。人在什么地方宰杀燔祭牲，就要在那里宰杀赎愆祭牲，它的血要泼在祭坛的四周。祭司要把祭牲的一切脂肪都献上，就是肥尾巴和遮盖内脏的脂肪，以及两个肾、肾上近腰旁的脂肪和肾旁的肝叶，一起取下。然后把这些焚烧在祭坛上，作献给耶和华的火祭，这是赎愆祭。祭司家中的男丁，都可以吃祭牲的肉，要在圣洁的地方吃；这是至圣的。赎罪祭怎样，赎愆祭也怎样；两个祭的律例相同；祭物要归主持赎罪的祭司，祭司替人献燔祭，祭牲的皮要归献燔祭的祭司。一切在炉里烤的，或在浅锅里或在煎盘上做的素祭，都要归给那献祭的祭司。一切用油调和，或是干的素祭，都要归给亚伦所有的子孙，大家均分。』
(利未记 7:1-10 新译本)
神是光，在他里面毫无黑暗；这就是我们从他那里听见，现在传给你们的信息。
我们若说自己与他彼此相通，却行在黑暗里，就是说谎话，不实行真理了。
我们若行在光中，像他在光中一样，就彼此相通，他儿子耶稣的血也洁净我们脱离一切罪。
我们若说自己没有罪，就是自欺，真理就不在我们里面了。
我们若承认自己的罪， 神是信实的、公义的，必定赦免我们的罪，洁净我们脱离一切不义。
我们若说自己没有犯过罪，就是把 神当作说谎的，他的道就不在我们心里了。
(约翰一书 1:5-10 新译本)
And this is the message which we have heard from Him and announce to you, that God is light and in Him is no darkness at all.
If we say that we have fellowship with Him and yet walk in the darkness, we lie and are not practicing the truth;
But if we walk in the light as He is in the light, we have fellowship with one another, and the blood of Jesus His Son cleanses us from every sin.
If we say that we do not have sin, we are deceiving ourselves, and the truth is not in us.
If we confess our sins, He is faithful and righteous to forgive us our sins and cleanse us from all unrighteousness.
If we say that we have not sinned, we make Him a liar, and His word is not in us.
(1 John 1:5-10 Recovery Version)
